

Appendix I

In this appendix we analyze the ways in which different authors have conceptualized international influence by summarizing the actors they deem relevant, the agency of such actors, and the causal mechanisms that lead to regime change. Our main intention is to show that the research on international influences on political regimes has developed in conceptual silos, pointing to the need for a more consistent conceptualization effort at a more abstract level. These works discuss other work on international influences in regime change, but their discussions of international mechanisms in regime change vary considerably from author to author.

Before we list the works we reviewed, we briefly discuss three previous works that have attempted an overarching conceptualization in a similar way as we do. Kurt Weyland proposed organizing mechanisms along two dimensions. First, he focused on whether contagion happened among autonomous units or was driven by powerful ones—a distinction that we also find useful. Second, he distinguished between the objective impact of international forces and the influence of subjective factors such as perceptions, ideas, and norms.¹ The resulting typology helped organize existing mechanisms in four categories, but since most authors are objectivists, the vertical-subjective quadrant remained virtually void. Weyland himself was the only author to propose a horizontal-subjective mechanism. Jon Pevehouse categorized these mechanisms as a) diffusion and demonstration effects, b) epistemic communities and spillover, and c) use of force.² But categories “a” and “b” overlap in practice and, as Henry Hale argues, there is a fundamental difference between demonstration effects and “mediated cascading” (i.e. diffusion). Hale in turn provides his own binary typology, but his narrow focus on demonstration and diffusion fails to address the importance of power politics.³

We hope our distinction between horizontal (diffusion and demonstration) and vertical (hegemonic) mechanisms will help organize the literature presented in Table 1.⁴

Table 1. International Actors, Agency, and Mechanisms in Previous Studies

Author(s)	Actors	International Agency in regime change	International Mechanisms in regime change
Beissinger (2007)	Individuals, social movements and civil society organizations (pro-democratic), and elites (pro-authoritarian).	Limited. Reactions and timing are preset. Democratizers react to previous transitions and elites learn following predictable (modular) patterns.	Transnational communication facilitates emulation, leading to a tipping point. Elites learn how to respond and a new equilibrium is attained.
Boix (2011)	Two players. A low-income party (pro-democratic) and a high-income party.	None. Actors behave depending on development levels and characteristics of the international system.	Struggle over wealth distribution is the main driver but the effect is conditional on the support of democratic hegemons.
Brinks and Coppedge (2006)	Countries.	None. Contiguity with democratic countries (the geographic	Countries democratize seeking the rewards (peace, investment, etc.)

		environment) increases the chances of democratization.	expected from sharing their neighbors' regime type; USSR and US influence
Brown (2000)	Western powers, the Soviet Union (as authoritarian hegemon) and Eastern European countries.	Highly important. Changes in the authoritarian hegemon are essential; then transitioning countries reinforce the process.	Collapse of the authoritarian hegemon triggers the process, which is facilitated by western pressure and interconnectedness.
Bunce and Wolchik (2011)	Western pro- democratic states and civil society, successful democratizers, local oppositions and NGOs.	Fundamental. Oppositions and NGOs actively connect with western organizations, learn, and emulate the strategies of successful democratizers.	Through transnational networks, oppositions under authoritarianism learn how to apply sophisticated electoral techniques and pass the torch.
Dunning (2004)	Democratic donors and authoritarian recipients.	Relevant. Democratic donors introduce conditionalities but the international context determines the effect of such policies.	Since aid is conditional on democratization, recipients face incentives to do so, unless they find alternatives sources to leverage that pressure.
Huntington (1991)	Several. The US, European democracies, the Catholic Church, the Soviet Union, and smaller, transitioning democracies.	Limited. As a rule of thumb, powerful actors wield more agency. Small countries are overall affected by changes in the international environment.	Multiple. Change in power, doctrine and strategy of relevant international actors tips the balance towards democratizers. Snowballing also may take place among smaller countries.
Levitsky and Way (2010)	Western democracies, indigenous governments, and non-democratic regional powers ("black knights").	Not important. Governments are constrained by the linkage to and leverage of Western democracies. Western democracies wield more agency as those factors increase.	International leverage and linkage. The authors provide detailed coding for both variables.
Mainwaring and Pérez- Liñán (2013)	Organized political actors (military, trade unions, parties, etc.) grouped in pro- and anti- democratic coalitions.	Relevant. Normative preferences and choices matter, although they are constrained by strategic interaction and the regional	Regional diffusion of normative beliefs and demonstration effects. Powerful external actors such as the US can provide incentives, sanction, commit

		context.	resources, or directly intervene to tip the domestic balance.
Markoff (1996)	Conservative elites, elite reformers and social movement challengers.	Fundamental. Social movements interact transnationally and are themselves the agents of diffusion.	The diffusion of ideas, forms of public action, organizational vehicles, and symbols.
Pevehouse (2005)	Democratic states coalesced in international organizations (IOs), and local pro-authoritarian coalitions.	Relevant. The effect of the IOs depends entirely on the policies of democratic members. Domestic coalitions primarily react to these policies.	Democracies press using the IO's frame. Social elites acquiesce to liberalize. Finally, the IO supports the transitional government.
Starr (1991)	Individuals.	Limited. Individuals do channel and induce change but are mostly affected by global, regional and neighboring effects.	Demonstration effects and normative diffusion due to cognitive linkage and psychological interdependence.
Teorell (2010)	Incumbent elites and pro-democratic oppositions.	Relevant. Elite and opposition interact strategically and determine the institutional frame but are constrained by the environment.	International mechanisms include economic shocks, pressure from IOs, neighboring effects and telecommunications.
Torfason and Ingram (2010)	Individual countries (as member states of IOs).	None. The socializing effect of IOs is not dependent on the individual member's behavior.	IOs act as networks that promote members' isomorphism. Predominant values diffuse.
Wejnert (2005)	Individual countries.	None. Diffusion depends entirely on the geographic environment in which countries are embedded.	Diffusion takes place through spatial proximity, networks (economic, political and colonial) and the media.
Weyland (2014)	Individuals.	Limited. Individuals are the main agents of change but transitions take hold only under proper organizational environments.	Diffusion is triggered by an initial transition, and contention spreads as individuals apply cognitive shortcuts overstating the case for replication.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

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¹ Weyland, "The Diffusion of Revolution"

² Pevehouse, "Democracy from Above," 10

³ Hale, "Regime Change Cascades"

⁴ Two important texts that do not fit our categorizations but provide key insights are Gleditsch and Ward "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," Kurzman "Waves of Democratization."