

The Evolution and Causes of Territorial Peace in the Americas

Appendix 3

Appendix C. Resistant Case Narratives for All Three Necessary Conditions.

1. Attention through Militarization

The settlement of the Oriente-Mainas dispute between Ecuador and Peru is our first case in chronological order. This settlement was preceded by frictions starting in 1940 as both states expanded their presence in the disputed area and send probes into each other's territory. Eventually hostilities broke out in July 1941 deriving in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian War or War of '41 – which caused c. 600 battled deaths (Wood 1966). After an initial armistice, negotiations ended up in a “Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries” signed in Rio in January 29, 1942 (Lecaro Bustamante 1997: 57), which conformed the commission that would have demarcated the boundaries in the broad Oriente-Mainas region by 1945. A small portion of the border in the Cordillera del Cóndor region, which was wrongly represented in the cartography of the treaty, led to a new Ecuadorian claim starting in 1948. Once again, parties did not consider the issue a priority until this led to a new episode of outstanding bilateral tensions half century later. Mimicking the 1940s episode, skirmishes in 1991 prompted Ecuador to build bases in the disputed zone and increase its military presence which, in turn, led to a much more important confrontation in 1995. In this new confrontation, known as the Cenepa War, some 5,000 troops were deployed. After 100 to 300 battle deaths, both parties agreed to sit in the negotiating table (Palmer, 1997: 120-121; Hey, 1995: 75-76). This second resistant case between Ecuador and Peru was finally settled in 1998.

Together with the Cenepa War, the Soccer War or War of the 100 Hours fought between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 was one of the only two major confrontations between Latin American countries in the post-1945 era and the first since 1941. As one would expect, it also played an important role in solving the resistant case dispute that affected their bilateral relations. The crisis spiraled out of incidents after a soccer match in June 15. These incidents caused anti Salvadoran pogroms near Tegucigalpa by the end of the month, which led to the invasion of Honduras on month later, on July 14 (Rouquié and Vale 1973). The OAS was able to stop the fighting only four days after the initiation of hostilities and deployed a mission of military observers

after this belated intervention. The incident jumpstarted a series of negotiations and accords that advanced steadily amidst the far more complex Central American crisis and would end up in the 1992 settlement.

In Southern Cone, the Beagle Channel dispute, another of our resistant cases, was also settled nearly after militarization reached historical records. Tensions mounted in January 1978, when Argentina declared the British award that granted the territories to Chile to be null. Since then, both countries seriously considered a military confrontation in the central Andes – i.e. the Maule region – and in the territories and waters adjacent to the islands. Armed forces remained in red alert and ready to be deployed in less than 24 hours. The possibility of taking the islands by force was seriously considered by Buenos Aires as negotiations were taking place in December 1978 (Villar 2016: 1). It is believed that Argentina and Chile were literally minutes away from war. First hand testimonies indicate that on December 22, 1978, Argentina launched Operation Sovereignty, which intended to retake the islands by force. The operation most probably would have caused an all out war – the worst post-1945 conflagration in the Americas – had it not been suspended twenty nautical miles off the coast of Chile due to a fierce storm (Mares 2001: 138). A “divine” intervention of the Pope took place only a few days after, prevented new episodes like this, and accompanied the process until the 1984 settlement.

A less intense but nonetheless comparable example was provided by Argentina and Uruguay a few years before. The settlement of the River Plate border dispute in November 1973 also took place in the midst of recurrent militarized disputes in a dyad that rarely presented them. These MIDs started after Argentina forcefully occupied the island Martin Garcia in 1969. Confrontations escalated thereafter, driven by the concurrence of a leftist turn in Argentina – the return of Perón to the country, which was perceived as a victory by certain guerrilla movements such as *Montoneros* and negatively by the military – and a rightist turn in Uruguay – as president Bordaberry started to implement iron fist policies against the *Tupamaros* guerrilla in alliance with the armed forces. Issues such as the devolution of political refugees and frequent conflicts over unauthorized military activities in the border created a perilous scenario. Absent the possibility of further escalation it is possible that authorities would not have been prompted to settle the territorial dispute as they were (Escudé and Cisneros 2000: 220).

We can reinforce the aforementioned within-case counterfactuals by looking at

some cross-case evidence involving $Y=0$ cases. Although resistant cases that were settled can often be linked to some of the most relevant Latin American crises of the post-WWII era – e.g. the Soccer War, the Central American crisis, the War of '41, the Cenepa War, the Itaipú Crisis, and the Beagle Crisis – unresolved resistant cases almost never reached these level of hostilities, the Falklands/Malvinas War being the only exception. Some ongoing resistant cases such as the Guatemala-Belize dispute provoked a notable number of MIDs – one every three years in average – but none of them reached relevant levels of severity.¹ Very minor MIDs took place in the late 1970s and early 2000s between Suriname and Guyana, mostly involving the seizure of river craft (Allock et al 1992, 598-601). Venezuelan and Guyanese forces were never involved in a major confrontation either.²

2. Altering Preferences through Democratization

The resolution of the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay provides a clear case for our regime fragility hypothesis. Negotiations ending in the River Plate Treaty of November 1973 started, proceeded and ended swiftly, but were possible only after the democratically-elected interim government of Héctor José Cámpora took office in Argentina, in May 1973, after seven years of authoritarianism. Even though Cámpora was a Peronist and was initially thought to represent the Argentine left, the Uruguayan president Juan María Bordaberry was starting to drift towards a rightist position. In late June, Bordaberry closed congress, starting a three-year period as head of an authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, Juan Perón returned to Argentina to take command of his movement. In this fragile situation, Cámpora and then Perón faced great incentives to solve the River Plate issue and increase bilateral cooperation with Uruguay as a way to signal the military that the new Peronist government could deal with the strategic environment, securing Uruguayan cooperation against guerrilla movements and the

¹ Most of these episodes involve an alleged incursion of neighboring forces into each other's territory.

² When a relatively serious MID arose, it often led – as expected – to some demonstration of good will in the bilateral negotiations, but this happened only twice. Since Guyana's independence in 1966, two episodes seem to be more relevant in this regard. The first of these episodes is the Venezuelan machine gun and mortar shelling of Eteringbang on February 21st and 22nd, 1970, which was never consented by Venezuelan president Caldera and to which Guyanese forces never responded, and yet ended in the negotiation of the Protocol of Port of Spain in less than four months which imposed a twelve-year moratorium on the resolution of the dispute. The second episode took place between September 3 and 5, 1982, and involved a series of Venezuelan incursions into Guyanese territory that were driven out by the firing of warning bursts. As the 1970 episode, this MID resulted in zero casualties, and yet the parts responded to it by accelerating the designation of the UN Secretary General as mediator – i.e. the single major step forward in the negotiations since 1970 – which took place in a period of less than six months after the episode (Ishmael 2013: 312).

Brazil-Paraguay axis.³ Conversely, Bordaberry, also under the pressure of his own militarymen, favored a quick understanding with Argentina (Escudé and Cisneros 2000: 209). This improbable convergence of factors provides strong grounds for our case: What are the odds that two countries in a dyad will both undergo a regime transition *and* settle their last territorial dispute all in the same ten-month period?

A decade later, Argentina will provide another example of how weak democracies may be especially prone to settle hard disputes. The weakening of the military organization in Argentina after the Falklands/Malvinas War was also critical for an agreement with Chile regarding the Beagle Channel dispute. Members of the Argentine Junta were convinced that Santiago's case would have never succeeded had it not been for the weakness of previous democratic governments, and were ideologically committed to resolve the dispute in their nation's favor at all costs. Additionally, scholars highlight that the institutional makeup of the Junta was also an important cause of the deadlock, allowing a belligerent navy to effectively block negotiations the army was more predisposed to (Villar 2016: 56-58, 62; Alles 2011; Russell 1990). Further pieces of evidence support the within-case counterfactual that the Beagle dispute would have never reached a resolution if the military had remained in power.⁴ It was not until the first democratic government took power that negotiations were unlocked. Regarding this case, scholars unanimously agree: "regime change should be understood as an explanatory factor" (Villar 2016: 158).⁵

The timing of the October 1980 General Treaty of Peace – also known as Lima accord – between El Salvador and Honduras also points to the importance of regime change in the resolution of resistant cases. The accord was signed only four months after Honduran General Policarpo Paz García, under pressure from the Carter administration, accepted to hold free and fair elections. The elections led to a transition in which Paz compromised to leave office by 1982, while a victorious Liberal Party

³ Brazil and Paraguay had just signed a treaty for the construction of a dam in Itaipú. The dam granted Brazilian strategic control over the flow of both the Paraná and Uruguay rivers – the two most important tributaries of the River Plate Basin – and at the time was seen by Argentine and Uruguayan military as a serious threat. We further discuss the issue in the following section.

⁴ This was evident in the fact that Argentine troops remained stationed in the border with Chile even during the Falklands/Malvinas War – some say because war plans included taking those islands as well after a swift victory against the British (Arquilla and Moyano 2001). Even after the defeat the Argentine military continued to consider force as a way to solve the Beagle dispute.

⁵ Democratic tools were important throughout the process of resolving the dispute too. Facing opposition from the Peronist party in the Argentina Senate, President Alfonsín called for a plebiscite in which 82 per cent of the Argentina population, tired of militarism, supported the proposed terms. Alfonsín's haste to resolve the dispute owed much to the uncertainties of Argentina's fragile transition and the need to overcome the threat of a new coup by weakening the military (Garrett 1985: 103).

agreed to accompany a process of gradual liberalization. Meanwhile, in El Salvador authoritarian President Carlos Humberto Romero was ousted by a coup on October 15, 1979, which promised democratization and social reform (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013: 175). The new government, led by prominent civilian reformists, strongly endorsed the agreement with Honduras as a way to weaken military hardliners, but the liberalization attempt ended up failing due to polarization, the rise of a guerrilla movement, and ultimately, civil war. The window of opportunity for cooperation was virtually closed, but regime instability had produced the single most important step towards a long-lasting settlement.⁶ Last but not least, El Salvador transitioned toward full-fledge democracy almost in parallel to the 1992 final settlement, which coincided with the peace accords that ended its civil war. As Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán (2013: 204) put it: “international actors and influences decisively impacted [...] the peace accords of 1992, and the establishment of democracy in 1994 in El Salvador.”

The resolution of the Cordillera del Cóndor dispute between Ecuador and Peru shows, once again, this relation between regime fragility and the success of negotiations. The process that finally led to a settlement formally started on April 15, 1997, in Brasilia, and was substantively hurried up by the political needs of both presidents. On the Ecuadoran side, former president Abdalá Bucaram had just been removed from office on February 14, 1997, under grounds of mental incapacity. The impeachment process took place swiftly between two to four weeks after Bucaram paid the first state visit by an Ecuadoran head of state to Peru in history (St John 1999: 41) a gesture that was taken as a sign of frailty by the military. Although it is unclear whether the nationalist opposition to the treaty was the main cause of the impeachment, his successor, Jamil Mahuad, was certainly aware that the Cordillera del Cóndor dispute could be a main driver of presidential instability and a rapid resolution was necessary to consolidate his government (McClintock and Vallas 2003: 82). Back in Lima, Fujimori also saw an agreement as a possible way to strengthen his authority and, more importantly, regain some reputation in the eyes of the inter-American community.

⁶ Transition towards at least semi-democracy would finally take place in the mid-1980s, facilitating the accord that accepted an ICJ ruling to settle the dispute. El Salvador remained authoritarian until Napoleón Duarte won the 1984 elections. Honduran President Roberto Suazo (1982-1986) also proved fairly impotent vis-à-vis the military and only with the victory of his rival José Azcona (1986-1990) would the country return to the path of democratization. It was precisely then that both countries signed the Special Agreement of May 24, 1986, in which they compromised to submit the issue of Bolsones and the Gulf of Fonseca to the ICJ. The agreement was signed on the first day of the Esquipulas meeting which gathered all Central American and many other Latin American governments in the common understanding that for democracies to consolidate it was imperative to end international disputes and domestic violence.

Fujimori himself had closed Congress in a 1992 in an *autogolpe* (self-coup) that represented a regression into authoritarianism. Although George W. Bush had recognized Fujimori as the legitimate leader of Peru, and the Peruvian leader reopened Congress and fairly won the 1995 presidential elections – transitioning back to a democratic status – relations between Lima and Washington with regards to democracy and human rights had become more and more stringent under the Clinton administration. In this context, the resolution of the Cenepa crisis became an opportunity for Fujimori to directly involve the Clinton administration, thus enhancing his reputation as a democratic and peaceful leader.

Half century before similar dynamics had characterized the resolution of the Oriente-Mainas dispute. The period from the War of '41 to the final demarcation of the border in June 1945 coincides with the administration of Manuel Prado Ugarteche (1939-1945) who “having received a dictatorially governed Peru, had turned it over to his successor as a democratic country” (Chirinos Soto 1962: 62, cited in Pike 1967: 280). Similarly, Ecuador transitioned from a clear-cut dictatorship to a semi-democratic regime under populist leader José María Velazco Ibarra in 1944 (cf. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013) who had been ousted by the military a decade before and was determined to curtail its power by supporting the final 1945 settlement.

Again, ongoing resistant cases provide a good base for cross-case counterfactual reasoning. Until recently, Venezuela was, together with Colombia and Costa Rica, among the three most stable democracies in post-1945 Latin America. Accordingly, it was especially reluctant to relinquish its territorial claims. Belize provides a similar case, where democratic stability after independence has remained high and the state's position regarding the territorial dispute has also remained intransigent.⁷ Even when

⁷ Finally, resistant cases can also illustrate the importance of some regime dynamics. When protagonists such as Guatemala, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela experienced political crises, these also opened the possibility of negotiations in some occasions, which could have succeeded in the presence of our other necessary conditions. Let us entertain two very brief examples. As mentioned, Venezuela was a relatively stable democracy for all the period after Guayana's independence in 1966. Yet, the single major step towards the resolution of its dispute with Guyana – the designation of the UN Secretary General as mediator – was taken on March 23, 1983, only one month after the Venezuelan Black Friday that set off the most serious economic crisis since the 1930s. The combination of high debt, inflation, depreciation of the Bolivar and the drop in oil prices – a configuration that resembles that of the current Maduro dictatorship – was among the major threats to Venezuelan democracy until the 2000s and closely correlated with our expected outcome.

A similar example is provided by the Belize-Guatemala dispute. Since 1986, Guatemala's fragile democracy was characterized by frequent military coup attempts and the armed forces' renounce to negotiate a peace accord with guerrilla movements. Trying to break loose of these military constraints, President Jorge Serrano recognized the sovereignty of Belize – until then considered a province of Guatemala – on August 14, 1991. The context of regime instability in which these decisions took place is

regime change occurs, some cases are more stable and predictable than others. The endurance of the Bolivia-Chile dispute over Antofagasta, for example, illustrates how the strength of the military, in the context of a transition such as the Chilean one, can prevent the resolution of disputes that might be otherwise be intended under more instable and uncertain contexts.⁸

3. Assistance through Third-Party Involvement

Third party involvement was critical in putting Argentina and Chile on the negotiation track after they had almost gone to war. First, the support of the OAS and the UN would have granted Chile in the event of an Argentine attack played a significant role in moderating both Santiago and Buenos Aires (Villar 2016: 83). Second, the involvement of the Vatican as a mediator in December 24, 1978 – only four days after Operation Sovereignty – is universally seen as the main factor that avoided future escalation. Third, Washington played a prominent, though indirect role too. Both Argentina and Chile had substantial interest in involving the United States as a mediator in the Beagle dispute as a way to divert attention from human rights violations – the central concern of the Carter administration. Amidst rising tensions, Robert Pastor, National Security Advisor to President Carter, claims that both parties sent him a letter on early December 1978, which asked Washington to mediate. The State Department was reluctant to abandon the human rights policy to get involved in a mediation effort and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had a special relation with his countryman Pope John Paul II, facilitated the timely involvement of the Holy See (Villar 2016: 98-102). Thus, history points to the indirect influence of the United States and the OAS, and a more direct impact of the Vatican mediation. Nevertheless, while Rome's mediation helped keep both parties at bay, it was not nearly as useful in leading to a resolution of the dispute (Princen 1992). This further strengthens our case that third parties were necessary, but not sufficient, for the resolution of resistant cases after 1945.

The settlement of the Oriente-Mainas dispute between Ecuador and Peru in 1945 offers another good illustration. In the midst of World War II, the United States were

evidenced by the May 1993 closure of Congress by Serrano (Orellana Portillo 2012), which led to his resignation on June 1st. His successor, Ramiro de León Carpio, reinstated the claim, but Serrano's recognition led to a substantive limitation of the Guatemalan claim – roughly half of Belize – and allowed for the bilateral negotiations that have been going on since then.

⁸ In February 1993, Particio Aylwin, the first president of the Chilean democracy, instructed its diplomatic corps to solve all pending disputes by December of that year, but military acquiescence remained key to the success of this moderate transition and the project had to be abandoned (St John 1994).

certainly very interested in reaching a peaceful settlement of this dispute but fearing a direct intervention would divert the Department of State's attention from the war scenarios and alienate Latin American allies, Roosevelt tried to avoid getting directly involved (Wood 1966: 338; Wood 1978: 147). Instead, the United States supported the good offices of the Brazilian foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha. The 1942 Rio Protocol determined that a Demarcation Commission led by Braz Dias de Aguiar, the chief of the Brazilian boundary service, would award the new borders. Argentina, Chile, and the United States actively participated as guarantors that the demarcation would be in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Together with Brazil, these countries played a central – some would say fundamental (Palmer 1999) – role in assisting the parties.⁹ After the demarcation was completed, the United States Army Air Force surveyed the zone of the settlement in support of the Demarcation Commission, providing maps and revealing new details about the topography and hydrography of the region.¹⁰

When the Cenepa War broke out in late January 1995, the Ecuadoran President's first reaction was to call the guarantors of the Rio Protocol to intervene again in order to settle the Cordillera del Cóndor dispute, which was at the heart of the frictions. The four countries and the OAS acted as powerful constraints on both parts as hostilities developed for a month or so (Palmer 1996). In fact, both parties were already sitting in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations only a few days after the initiation of hostilities, negotiating the terms of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration of February 17, 1995. The guarantors also deployed 112 soldiers under the United Nation's Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP) – the entire contingent – on March 12. In the Santiago Agreements of October 1996, Ecuador and Peru decided that the guarantors would be the ones to decide the terms of a settlement should the parts prove unable to reach a solution. Therefore, envisioning renewed tensions, Presidents Fujimori and Mahuad decided to meet US President Bill Clinton in the White House on October 9, 1998, and asked the United States to propose a final solution, which the United States did together with the other three guarantors. The Global and Definitive Peace

⁹ Aranha played a particularly important role in the process, acting as a de-facto arbiter over the practical disputes that appeared as a result of the demarcation (Krieg 1986: 129).

¹⁰ These maps showed a fundamental flaw in the demarcation of the areas near the Cenepa River, which would be at the core of the subsequent Cordillera del Cóndor dispute. In 1948 Quito ordered not demarcate the zone and in 1960 declared the Rio Protocol null. However, most of the border besides the Cenepa River region had been demarcated already and the Oriente-Mainas dispute remained broadly settled in this second phase.

Agreement was signed on 26 October 1998 under the terms proposed by the guarantors (St John 1999: 43).

Third parties played a key role in the El Salvador-Honduras dispute over Bolsones and Gulf of Fonseca as well. After the 1969 Soccer War the OAS patrolled a demilitarized zone in the area of Bolsones and acted as a facilitator until the “Convention for the Adoption of a Mediation Procedure between the Republics of El Salvador and Honduras,” was subscribed in October 1976. The agreement named the Peruvian magistrate and member of the International Court of Justice, José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, as head of the mediation efforts that would end in the 1980 General Treaty of Peace (Lauterpacht and Greenwood 1994). Over the mid and late 1970s, Washington had pushed for a final resolution of the dispute over the *bolsones* (pockets) between the two countries due to strategic concerns that the region was being used as a stronghold by guerrilla movements (Phil Gunson and Thompson 1991: 44-45). During the early Reagan years, however, the United States was too involved in Central America to be an effective mediator. As it happened with the Vatican in the case of Argentina-Chile, other actors had to fill the vacuum, and the Contadora Group – Panamá, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia – did so with outstanding efficiency (Wehr and Lederach 1991).¹¹

In all the aforementioned cases, it is third party pressure and not dispute resolution mechanisms themselves that produced the settlement. Quite on the contrary, when mediation, arbitration, or adjudication is intended without overwhelming political backup, the process can backfire. The rejection of arbitration awards was a main cause of escalation in resistant case disputes.¹² Conversely, when outside pressure existed and conflict resolution mechanisms were absent, the resolution of resistant cases was also

¹¹ Involvement of Latin American countries grew with time – e.g. the Contadora Support Group composed by Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay got involved – as did the pressure for Central American states to reach an agreement, end their disputes, and democratize. Finally, the involvement of Latin American neighbors would be important to foster the recognition of the ICJ by both parties on May 24, 1986. The agreement took place in Guatemala, in the context of the Esquipulas Declaration, in which several other Central American governments addressed other concerns related to international and domestic peace in the region. These issue-linking strategies and deployment of regional support, framing the Honduras-El Salvador border settlement as part of a Central American process, were undoubtedly important.

¹² In particular arbitration was very problematic in the absence of an international environment that compelled both actors to accept the award. In the Oriente-Mainas dispute the Spanish Arbitration of 1887, for instance, was suspended several times and its final 1910 award almost led to war between the two countries after Ecuador rejected it (Tobar and Tobar 1994). A similar situation took place in January 1978, when Argentina declared the award by Queen Elisabeth II – which granted the islands in the Beagle Channel to Chile – to be insuperably null and void.

facilitated. The Rio de la Plata dispute illustrated this point. The Argentina-Uruguay dispute fits this narrative in a slightly different way. Pressure from third parties was necessary to instill cooperation between Buenos Aires and Montevideo. In this particular case, however, cooperation was not favored only by third party facilitation, mediation, or arbitration. Third parties, in general, were excluded from the negotiation process in an issue that was considered by the parties as bilateral (Del Castillo 2008: 47-53) The key external push was the Brazilian threat to control strategically the water flows of the Plata Basin, which became clear when a treaty between Brazil and Paraguay in April 1973 provided for the construction of the Itaipú Dam. The Argentine and Uruguayan military saw the project as evidence of a Brazilian threat and chose to secure their alliance by settling their contentious issues (Biswas 2013: 79).¹³ This, however, did not mean that mediation did not play a central role in the signature of the Treaty of the La Plata River and its Maritime Limits. Quite on the contrary, a Mixed Technical Commission created by both governments in 1971 did almost all the work that led to the final version of the treaty. The technical commission played the role of a mediator, crafting a mutually acceptable solution that was then available to the parties when regime change took place in Argentina and negotiations were sped up. Moreover, the possibility of reversion to the International Court of Justice – recognized in article 87 of the treaty – was a key to defining Montevideo’s willingness to participate as well.

Again, looking at ongoing resistant cases provides material for some cross-case inferences. For instance, states in the Southern Cone and the United Kingdom comprise an important part of the sample of countries that have not settled their disputes. This suggests that Washington’s hegemony – which is certainly less overwhelming *vis-à-vis* these cases – may be a crucial factor in the resolution of hard territorial disputes.¹⁴

¹³ When the Uruguayan president visited his peer in Buenos Aires during February 1974 to deposit the instruments of ratification of the River Plate Treaty, both chief executives signed an agreement to build the Salto Grande Dam over the Uruguay River. Historians agree the decision to co-build this dam was taken by both presidents during a phone call in June 1973 – a few months after the Itaipú treaty – and the resolution of the river dispute was necessary to move forward. All this provides further evidence that the territorial settlement was driven by third party pressure (Escudé and Cisneros 2000: 220).

¹⁴ In some cases, such as the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, authors have explicitly identified the lack of relative American leverage as a crucial factor (Tulchin 1987). The main counterfactual involved here could be posed as follows: What if both parties involved in the Belize, Corentyn, Essequibo, and Malvinas/Falklands dispute had been Latin American states? A cursory review of these disputes suggests that they would most probably have been resolved already. Third party pressures were virtually absent in the Guatemala-Belize dispute during most of Belize’s colonial history. The United States and the United Kingdom had an explicit understanding over the status of British Honduras before 1945 and then the issue was seen primarily as a self-determination question, which postponed the resolution of the dispute. During the existence of British Guyana, the Venezuelan claim over Essequibo was virtually free from any external constraints as well. As with the Falklands/Malvinas, Belize, and Corentyn issue, the dispute

Appendices References

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involved the overlapping issue of decolonization and its resolution, which ultimately depended on a geopolitical understanding between London and Washington, had to be postponed until self-determination was achieved. After being precluded for more than a century, third party involvement has certainly become a possibility after the independence of Belize, Guyana, and Suriname, but a final resolution remains elusive, probably because of the absence of the other two key factors we highlight in our model.

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